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A  notable  feature  of  the  1920s  and  1930s  is  the  volatility  in  several  key  macroeconomic 
aggregates, and this feature used to econometrically identify the reaction of the Fed to stock 
market developments. The volatility of economic activity may have contributed to deepening the 
divisions among policy-makers about how the Fed ought to respond to stock price developments. 
Relying on the technique of Rigobon (2003), volatility is used as an instrument to estimate the 
Fed’s response to the stock market. Other identification assumptions based on structural VARs 
produce compatible results. Fed behavior appeared to have changed following the stock market 
crash of 1929. Consistent with the Riefler-Burgess doctrine, interest rates and stock returns are 
negatively related. I conclude that, prior to the stock market crash of 1929, a form of benign 
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1.  Introduction 
  An enormous literature explores the events surrounding the 1929 stock market crash in 
the United States. The present paper provides new evidence about the role that stock prices 
played in influencing the conduct of monetary policy at the Fed over the period from 1920 to 
1938. I find that Fed policy amounted to fueling the rise in stock market prices prior to the fall of 
1929. This result may be explained by disagreement amongst policy makers over how to respond 
to asset price developments before the stock market crash, reflecting divisions over the degree of 
activism deemed adequate in the conduct of monetary policy (e.g., see Friedman and Schwartz 
1963, pp. 254-66). There is also some evidence that Fed responses may have fueled the stock 
price increase that resulted in the Great Crash. In contrast, the Fed appears to have responded 
more appropriately to stock  market developments, especially during the 1930s by increasing 
interest rates when stock prices were rising. Broadly speaking, the contemporaneous correlation 
between a key interest rate and stock returns is negative before the crash of 1929 but turns 
positive following that pivotal event. It is argued that the volatility of selected macroeconomic 
indicators is a critical ingredient to understanding this period of US economic history.  
  Meltzer (2003) is perhaps the latest to suggest that Federal Reserve policy during the 
1920s and 1930s was significantly affected by stock market developments. He downplays other 
interpretations of the Great Depression, such as the debt-deflation view of Bernanke (1983) and 
Fisher (1933), the impact of Benjamin Strong’s death in 1928 (Friedman and Schwarz 1963), the 
Fed’s  poor  understanding  of  the  role  of  monetary  policy  (Wicker  1966),  and  Eichengreen’s 
(1992a) emphasis on the breakdown of international cooperation under the constraints imposed 
by the Gold Standard. Meltzer, however, is neutral on the question of whether the Fed actively 
responded to the stock market. Romer (1990, 1992) takes the view that links exist between stock 
market performance and Fed decisions during the 1920s, while Rappoport and White (1994) 
conclude  that  there  were  signs,  especially  in  financial  markets,  that  the  1929  stock  market 
collapse may have been anticipated at least a year in advance. An unresolved issue is whether the 
era considered in this paper should be treated as a single “regime” instead of one subject to a 
break around 1928 or 1929. For example, there is some evidence to suggest that the conduct of   2
monetary policy may not have changed drastically from the early 1920s through most of the 
1930s (e.g., Wheelock 1991, Meltzer 2003).
 1  
  This  paper  provides  new  evidence  to  identify,  econometrically,  the  contemporaneous 
relationship between stock market returns and interest rates. One approach (e.g., Orphanides 
2003; Wheelock 1991) is to estimate a Taylor type rule. While such a relationship would not 
have been known at the time, the notion that the Fed ought to actively conduct policy so as to 
maintain some form of price stability was, in fact, widely discussed both inside and outside the 
Fed  during  the  1920s  (e.g.,  Friedman  and  Schwartz  1963,  pp.  254-66,  Eichengreen  1992a, 
Meltzer 2003 (pp. 181-92), Hetzel 2007 (Chapter 3)). It is important to emphasize that estimation 
of a reaction function for this period in U.S. economic history should be viewed purely as a 
heuristic device. Such an approach helps underscore the notion that the Fed was concerned with 
macroeconomic events, not in a mechanical fashion, of course, but in a broad sense. Several 
authors (e.g., Wheelock 1991, Orphanides 2003, Bordo, Helbling and James 2006) have relied 
on  the  estimation  of  reaction  functions  to  describe  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy  during 
selected historical epsiodes. Moreover, it is also correct to state that, over the sample considered 
in this paper, a short-term interest rate served as a policy instrument. Therefore, it is convenient 
to examine the hypothesis addressed in this paper through the device of a Taylor rule (also see 
Wheelock 2000, Hetzel 2007 (Chapter 3)).  
  Other than Wheelock (1991, Chapter 2) there has, to my knowledge, been no attempt to 
estimate a “reaction function” for the Federal Reserve over this period, or to econometrically test 
whether  stock  market  or credit  developments  influenced  Fed  behavior.  As  we  shall  see, the 
results of this approach illuminate Fed actions particularly when real time data are employed, or 
if stock market developments are permitted to play an (indirect) role in the reaction function 
specification. Because estimates from standard policy rules do not entirely satisfactorily measure 
the reaction of the Fed to stock market developments, I next consider whether stock market 
volatility can be used serves as an instrument in a statistical sense. This technique is employed in 
the  econometric  identification  of  the  Fed’s  reaction  to  the  stock  market,  based  on  the 
                                                 
1 Many authors have identified “breaks” arising from the time series properties of the data (e.g., Perron 1989), 
significant technological shocks (e.g., Field 1993, Francis and Ramey 2005), errors or changes in the conduct of 
monetary policy (e.g., Bordo, Choudhri, and Schwartz 2002), or the strains imposed by adherence to a particular 
economic ideology (e.g., Eichengreen 1992a). Hofman and Rasche (1989), in a study of the demand for monthly M1 
(and other monetary aggregates) before World War II conclude that the standard relationship is stable. White (2006) 
surveys booms and busts in U.S. stock markets during the 20
th Century.   3
methodology of Rigobon (2003). Finally, estimates from a structural VAR are also presented, 
and these are found to complement the results from the identification through heteroskedasticity 
approach. Since all three econometric approaches yield findings that support the hypothesis of 
this paper, there are good econometric grounds to conclude not only that the Fed reacted to stock 
market developments during the period considered but that the nature of the response changed 
after the stock market crash of 1929. 
To highlight the potential role played by volatility in the analysis to follow, consider 
Figure 1. Figure 1A plots industrial production growth for the period 1920-1938 together with 
data  for  the  sample  1985-2003  to  provide  some  perspective.
 2 Figure  1B  repeats  the  same 
exercise  for  stock  prices.  The  contrast  between  the  two  eras  is  striking.
3 More  importantly 
perhaps, for the 1920-1938 period, there are periods of calm followed by years when volatility is 
large. It is the volatility of key macroeconomic series that points to the technique developed by 
Rigobon (2003) as a useful means of econometrically identifying the Fed’s reaction to the stock 
market.   
  An overriding concern among Fed officials during the 1920s was the behavior of asset 
prices, especially stock prices (Friedman and Schwartz 1963 (pp. 254-67), Hetzel 2007 (Chapter 
3)). Some believed that speculation in asset markets presaged an imminent recession. Adherents 
to a version of the real bills doctrine, called the Riefler-Burgess doctrine (e.g., see Meltzer 2003, 
p. 161-65), saw no contradiction in maintaining lower interest rates while simultaneously relying 
on moral suasion, or other instruments at the Fed’s disposal, to extinguish feverish stock market 
speculation. Indeed, it was not until August 1929 that Harrison’s point of view succeeded in 
convincing his fellow governors to raise the Fed’s discount rate by a full percentage point (inter 
alia, Meltzer 2003, Hetzel 2007). 
Also germane to the approach adopted in this paper is Bordo and Jeanne (2004), who 
examine  sharp  historical  asset price  reversals  in  several  countries  and  conclude  that  a  “pro-
active” policy vis-à-vis asset booms and busts might yield better economic outcomes. As noted 
above,  not  all  observers  agree  with  this  position  (e.g.,  Bernanke  2002,  Greenspan  2005). 
                                                 
2 Clearly, the series considered are not identically defined across these samples. Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
believe that measurement errors or definitional changes can account for most of the large discrepancies in the 
volatility of these series.  
3 The most recent period covered in Figure 1 essentially overlaps with the Greenspan era. Greenspan (2005) 
attributes economic developments during his time in office to a combination of economic stability and productivity 
improvements that “…have propelled asset prices higher.” (op.cit., page 3) The latter development was a feature of 
the economic landscape during the 1920s while the former was not, as is clear from Figure 1.   4
Moreover, their identification of booms and busts in asset prices is based on the deviation in a 
moving  average  relative  to  a  long-run  historical  average.  While  this  is  a  plausible,  albeit 
somewhat ad hoc, approach, Figure 1 (also see below) makes the point that volatility may also 
have played a central role in explaining the Fed’s reaction to the stock market boom of 1928-
1929. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines potential avenues 
through which the discount rate and the stock market were believed to have been linked. Next, I 
discuss some data related issues, and provide some suggestive evidence based on Taylor rule 
estimation using final revised and real time data. Rigobon’s (2003) technique of identification 
through heteroskedasticity is described next, followed by the empirical estimates based on this 
approach. Additional evidence relying on structural VARs is also reported. The paper concludes 
with a discussion of the main findings and some of the limitations of the study. 
2. The Monetary Policy – Stock Market Link 
2.1  The Fed and the Stock Market 
  Meltzer’s (2003) magisterial account of the history of the Federal Reserve (Fed) during 
its first decades emphasizes that the Riefler-Burgess doctrine “… played a major role in the 
1920s and beyond” (op. cit., p.  138). The doctrine holds that member bank borrowings would be 
linked to a rise or a fall in the discount rate, replacing the gold reserve ratio as the indicator to 
which the Fed would respond. A rise in the discount rate was meant to signal a reduction in 
member bank borrowings. Hence, the level of borrowing serves as an indicator of monetary ease 
or tightness. However, if banks borrow to expand their asset holdings then monetary ease would 
take place in a boom while a recession would be associated with monetary restraint. Indeed, 
Wheelock (1991, p. 48) points out how the misleading signals given by the discount rate led to 
greater economic instability. Benjamin Strong is said to have suggested that the Fed may have 
acted when the spread between the discount rate and market rates was “…deemed too far out of 
line…” (Wheelock 1991, p. 31).
 4  
                                                 
4 It is unclear how large the spread was thought to be necessary to prompt the Fed to react. A plot of the difference 
between the New York discount rate and the commercial paper rate (not shown) suggests asymmetry in the spread. 
A threshold model of the spread, estimated using the asymmetric unit root test developed by Enders and Granger 
(1998), confirms that there is a preponderance of negative values (i.e., the spread is below the threshold) and this 
may suggest that Fed policy can be interpreted as being consistently too easy until about 1932. The obligatory caveat 
about the relatively low power of unit root tests should be mentioned.   5
Of particular concern to many Fed officials at the time were how loans were being used. 
Since  the  real  bills  doctrine  view  of  monetary  policy  prevailed  many,  including  Chairman 
Adolph Miller, believed that loans used to fuel stock purchases were unproductive and, therefore, 
ought to be discouraged. Others also shared the view that borrowings contributed to influencing 
share price movements (e.g., Reed 1930) and that the source of the problem was the discount rate 
policy  of  the  Fed.  Dominguez,  Fair,  and  Shapiro  (1988),  report  that  the  Harvard  Economic 
Service and Irving Fisher were unable to forecast the severity of the Great Depression of the 
1930s.
5  Nevertheless, both forecasting groups were interested in the links between interest rates 
(viz., the commercial paper rate) and equity returns (op.cit., p. 598). Of course, not everyone 
inside or outside the Fed accepted the need to use discount rate policy to offset real or perceived 
stock  market  excesses.  Benjamin  Strong, for one, was skeptical of the argument noting that 
higher interest rates will also affect businesses and individuals not involved in stock market 
related transactions (Meltzer 2003, p. 225). Harris (1933, p. 186 ff) argues that the Fed focused 
wrongly on reserve bank credit outstanding instead of member bank balances, that is, roughly 
what would today be referred to as the monetary base. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 254-
66)  argue  that  the  Fed  effectively  resisted  using  ‘direct  pressure’  on  speculative  loans  via 
changes in the rediscount rate until 1929. Indeed, Fed actions prior to that time may well have 
fueled the stock market boom until the crash of 1929.  
  The central role played by monetary considerations in these discussions reflects the fact 
that  the  principal  goal  of  the  young  Federal  Reserve  System  was  to  maintain  steady  credit 
conditions (also see Humphrey 2001). Currie (1934) is a succinct summary of this view, as is 
Harris’ (1933) who, like Meltzer (2003), underscores the ambivalence, if not hesitation inside the 
Fed, about whether stock market activity ought to elicit any monetary policy response. Currie 
(1934)  cites  Keynes  (1950)  who  approves  of  policy-makers  displaying  a  concern  for  stock 
market developments. “Thus during the Wall Street boom of 1929 attention was rightly paid to 
increases and decreases in the volume of loans made by “broker houses …” (op. cit., p. 251). The 
fact that some, but not all, policy-makers were concerned about the impact of a stock market bust 
                                                 
5 McGrattan and Prescott (2004) argue that Fisher believed the stock market to be undervalued on the eve of the 
stock market crash.    6
on the creditworthiness of some borrowers is not surprising since the 1920s represented a period 
of rapid growth in nominal debt (Fackler and Parker 2005).
6 
   Attempting to decipher the motivations of policy-makers is further complicated by an 
impression  that  individual  policymaker’s  views  were  rather  changeable  depending  on  the 
circumstances.  Therefore, over the period studied here, the monetary policy regime may have 
changed.
7 Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue that Benjamin Strong’s death brought about at 
least one regime change. Eichengreen and Mitchener (2004) also highlight what they believe is 
instability in the conduct of monetary policy. Others, of course, prefer to emphasize changes in 
the perception of policy-makers about how to ensure price stability or, rather, errors of judgment 
about the source and influence of financial market developments such as those taking place in 
the stock market (e.g., see Wicker 1965, Romer 1992, Calomiris and Wheelock 1998).  
  There  was  also  an  element of  hubris  among  the  governors of  the  Fed  could  also  be 
detected. After all, for a good part of the 1920s, and especially in 1923, the Fed delivered price 
stability  and  had  successfully  used  discount  rate  policy  to  achieve  that  outcome  when  the 
prospect of an overheating economy was defused by what today would be called a pre-emptive 
strike. Moreover, there were concerns expressed over the volatility of credit movements and, 
indeed, whether these could somehow contribute to errors in judgment over the proper course for 
monetary policy. For example, Reed (1930, p. 198) writes that “… mistakes have usually been 
later admitted whenever the aggregate credit supply of the country has been permitted to undergo 
pronounced fluctuations for any extended period of time.” However, there was no recognition 
that  deflation  and  real  interest  rate  behavior  were  connected.  Instead,  the  focus  was  almost 
exclusively on the “speculative excesses” of credit markets and the desirability to stamp these 
out.
8  
                                                 
6 Not all sectors were equally affected. See Olney (1999) and Fackler and Parker (2005, n. 7) for additional 
references. 
7 Moreover, as one referee correctly points out, until 1933, regional federal reserve banks could, and occasionally 
did, individually set discount rates. However, by 1923, attempts to centralize the conduct of monetary policy were 
well underway and, though not always successful, policy-makers did begin to recognize that the System was playing 
an increasingly important role in determining national credit and monetary conditions (e.g., Meltzer 2003, pp. 153-
43). 
8 Moral suasion, and margin requirements, are frequently mentioned as “instruments” to achieve “quantitative” 
objectives” using “qualitative” tools. Humphrey (2001) uses this nomenclature to explain Fed behavior during the 
1920s and 1930s. However, there is little hard evidence as to how these might have actually influenced speculative 
activity. On the importance of margin requirements in the debt-deflation literature, see von Peter (2005).   7
Wheelock (1991, Chapter 2), using the first difference of the discount rate, estimates 
purely  backward-looking  reduced  form  reaction  functions.  He  reports  a  positive  relationship 
between  the  lagged  stock  return  and  the  current  change  in  the  discount  rate.  However, 
Wheelock’s specification is unable to identify the Fed’s reaction to stock market developments 
since the variables in question are simultaneously determined. 
  It  is  clear  from  the  foregoing  discussion  that  asset  price  developments  played  an 
important role in policy deliberations throughout the 1920s and 1930s but it is unclear to what 
extent the Fed reacted to them.
9 By the 1930s hints emerge of a possible change in Fed policy. 
However, the real bills doctrine was not entirely expunged from Fed thinking. While it “… no 
longer had the force of law behind it” (Meltzer 2003, p. 485), the … “Riefler-Burgess doctrine 
continued as a general guide to policy actions …” (op. cit., p. 413). The lessons of the 1920s had 
still not been fully learned.
10  
  Finally, I would be remiss for failing to touch upon the evolution of decision-making at 
the Fed, and its impact on the conduct of monetary policy. Wheelock (2000) reviews all the 
relevant  issues  and  argues,  in  contrast  to  Eichengreen  (1992b)  and  Friedman  and  Schwartz 
(1963), that the decentralized decision-making structure of the Fed prior to the implementation of 
the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 was not the proximate cause for the monetary policies that 
ultimaltely gave rise to the Great Depression beginning in 1929.
11 As Wheelock (2000) goes on 
to argue, reserve banks could not effectively set their discount rate oblivious to levels set by 
other regional Federal Reserve banks. As a result, there was not total uniformity in discount rates 
across regions. However, it is not inappropriate to rely on New York rates as representative of 
                                                 
9 Concerns over stock market developments do not imply that the Fed had some numerical target for stock prices. I 
could not find any references to specific stock price index levels Fed officials might have had in mind when 
deliberating or discussing the stance of monetary policy. In written correspondence, Michael Bordo, Bob Hetzel, 
Hugh Rockoff and Eugene White also confirm the absence of any formal stock price or stock return target. 
10 Mehrling (2002) also examines the varieties of conflicting views about the role of the Fed during the 1920s and 
1930s. Unlike modern-day monetary policy implementation, students of U.S. economic history of the 1920s and 
1930s do not have at their disposal mathematical expressions of the “models” Fed policy makers might have in mind 
when they outlined their views about the impact of stock market conditions on the economy. Nevertheless, it is still 
the case today that monetary policy decisions are based on more than just a suite of models. As noted in the 
introduction, the interpretation of monetary policy actions is based on a heuristic depiction of the presumed link 
between macroeconomic and financial variables that appears in discussions of monetary policy by Fed officials 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s.  
11 Even Eichengreen (1992b) admits that not only was there ambiguity in the 1913 Federal Reserve Act statement: 
“Every Federal reserve bank shall have the power…to establish from time to time, subject to review and 
determination by the federal Reserve Board, …” (emphasis added) but that there were strong pressures favoring 
centralization by the mid 1920s.   8
interest rate levels across the whole system, and this is the position adopted in the empirical 
analysis that follows (also see Eichengreen 1992b).  
2.2 Monetary Policy and the Stock Market in Theory 
A popular view of the determination of stock prices is that they reflect expectations of 
future cash flows or changes in the discount factor. Another important strand of the literature 
views  stocks  as a  hedge against  inflation and,  therefore,  as  an  indicator of  future  economic 
activity. On the one hand, there is empirical evidence that links the stance of monetary policy, 
notably monetary expansions, with stock market performance (e.g., Thorbecke 1997). On the 
other, more recent evidence for the G7 countries suggests that the forecasting ability of asset 
prices is rather poor (Stock and Watson 2003). 
An important contribution by Allen and Gale (2000) posits that because stocks and real 
estate are often purchased with borrowed funds there is an incentive for borrowers to shift risk to 
lenders  who  may  not  be  able  to  observe  the  underlying  risks  of  the  investments  made  by 
borrowers. This produces an agency problem. Consequently, as bank credit expands, asset prices 
react more strongly than in the discounted expected payoff scenario. Hence, asset price volatility 
is an indicator of the consequences of excessively rapid bank credit expansion. It is this result 
that  motivates  adopting  the  identification  through  heteroskedasticity  methodology  due  to 
Rigobon (2003) to estimate the contemporaneous relationship between stock returns and interest 
rates.  When  shocks  produce  greater  volatility  in  the  stock  market,  the  covariance  between 
interest rates and stock returns is assumed to rise and this implies a positive link between these 
two variables. 
Rigobon and Sack (2003) find that the contemporaneous relationship between interest 
rates and stock market returns is positive for the Fed during the 1980s and 1990s. Bjørnland and 
Leitemo (2005), who estimate a structural VAR over roughly the same period in U.S. economic 
history, also report results compatible with the ones in Rigobon and Sack (2003). The possible 
connection between interest rates and stock returns, in particular, has also spawned a separate 
literature that asks whether or not it is appropriate for a central bank to target asset prices (e.g., 
Filardo 2001). That literature, however, is divided about the practicability of such a policy (e.g., 
see Bordo and Jeanne (2004), and references therein). Rigobon and Sack (2003) report that the 
Fed reacts to stock returns whereas it might be argued that central banks care more about stock   9
prices that deviate significantly (in an economic sense) from some underlying trend driven by 
fundamental economic factors (e.g., see Bohl, Siklos, and Werner 2007).  
3.  Data and Stylized Facts 
  Monthly data are used in the results reported below. Although the full sample considered 
consists of data for the period 1920-1938, data limitations mean that some specifications were 
estimated over slightly shorter samples. Monetary data are from the Board of Governors (1943), 
stock  market  index  data  were  obtained  from  Global  Financial  Data 
(http://www.globfindata.com),  with  additional  macroeconomic  data  from  the  NBER’s 
Macrohistory data base (http://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/contents/), and the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED2, ALFRED and FRASER databases. Real time data, consisting 
of vintage data for industrial production, were collected from the Fed Bulletin.
12  
  Figure 2A plots a variety of monthly short-term interest rates. The empirical evidence 
reported below relies on the New York commercial paper rate series (solid line) which appears 
broadly representative of the movement of short-term interest rates more generally. Also shown 
are the business cycles peaks and troughs as dated by the NBER. In the space of approximately 
19  years  there  were  five  recorded  recessions  (peak  to  trough  periods).  Figure  2B  plots  two 
indicators of stock returns, based on the close of the Standard and Poor’s index. The relatively 
noisy line is 100 times the monthly log change of the index while the relatively smoother line is 
the annual rate of change in same index. The latter highlights, most clearly, the 1929 stock 
market crash. Monthly returns also emphasize the changing volatility of stock returns over time 
and, once again, the period of the 1929 stock market collapse is clearly visible.  
  Figure 3 plots rolling standard deviations of S&P monthly returns and the commercial 
paper rate (top portion), while the simple rolling correlation between these same series is plotted 
separately (bottom portion). Rolling correlations tend to be negative more often prior to 1929 
than in the 1930-38 period. Rising or falling volatility in interest rates is accompanied by similar 
changes in the standard deviation of S&P returns. In general, interest rates are more volatile in 
the early 1920s, and then again in the late 1920s and early 1930s, at least based on monthly data. 
Volatility  is  relatively  high  for  stock  prices  around  the  time  of  the  stock  market  crash.  An 
obvious alternative to the rolling estimates is to rely on a conditional volatility model, such as a 
                                                 
12 Since this paper was first written, all vintages of industrial production since January 26, 1927 are now available 
from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis’ ALFRED data base (ALFRED, ArchivaL Federal Reserve Economic Data: 
http://alfred.stlouis.org).     10
GARCH(1,1),  to  identify  the  volatility  regime  (see  below).  Another  strategy  consists  in 
estimating a Markov switching model. Using the procedures outlined in Hamilton (1994, chapter 
22), I also estimate the (smoothed) probability of being in a high volatility regime based on the 
behavior  of  several  key  time  series.
13 They  are,  at  the  monthly  frequency:  inflation,  money 
supply growth, the growth in industrial production, U.S. gold stocks, borrowing at the Federal 
Reserve, and the (log) dividend-price ratio.
14 At the weekly frequency, volatility regimes are 
identified from the residuals of a VAR to be described below. In the case of inflation, at least 
three high volatility regimes are identified: one begins at the end of the 1920s, followed by 
another  one  shortly  after  1932.  A  third  high  volatility  regime begins  around  the  mid-1930s. 
Money growth produces comparable results. For industrial production, as well as the other series 
considered, low volatility regimes are the exception with one occurring around 1933 and another 
in 1934-1935. It is likely that the probability estimates for industrial production are sensitive to 
the sheer size of the drop in output during the Great Depression. (see Figure 1). Turning to fed 
borrowings, whose importance is underscored by Wheelock (1991, 47ff), a brief low volatility 
regime is apparent in 1931 then again in 1933, 1934-35, and 1938.  All of these estimates suggest 
several alternative dating schemes are candidates for high volatility regimes. Therefore, these 
results provide us with the opportunity to assess the robustness of our findings linking stock 
returns to interest rate movements to be presented in subsequent sections. 
 
4. Policy Rules for the 1920s and 1930s 
As is now well-known, policy evaluations based on estimates using final revised data can 
be misleading. Orphanides (2001) shows, for the U.S. for the period covering the 1980s to early 
1990s,  that  policy  prescriptions  based  on  real-time  data  yield  vastly  different  coefficient 
estimates  from  ones  obtained  using  final  revised  data.  Figure  4  plots  revisions  to  monthly 
industrial production based on four vintages of data. They are: September 1927, September 1929, 
March 1933, and September 1935. Data using other vintages yield comparable results. However, 
these four were chosen because they represent important milestones in the sample considered 
(Meltzer 2003, p. 174ff). In May 1927 the Fed began open market operations, while November 
                                                 
13 Maximum likelihood parameter estimates are relegated to an appendix (not shown). 
14 Borrowings at Federal Reserve banks is from Table 50 (Board of Governors 1943), industrial production is series 
M16002Q from the NBER historical data set (www.nber.org), gold reserves is series M14131G, also from the 
NBER historical data collection. Dividend price ratio data are taken from Robert Shiller’s website 
(http://aida.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/).    11
1927 is when the NBER identifies the trough of a recession. In addition, Meltzer (2003) argues 
that discussions inside the Fed about stock market speculation took on a bigger role by mid-
1927.  September  1929  is  likely  the  last  time  that  Fed  officials  would  have  seen  industrial 
production  data  prior  to  the  stock  market  crash.  February  1933  is  the  vintage  just  prior  to 
Roosevelt’s inauguration, while September 1937 is the last available vintage used in this study.
15 
Figure 4 plots the percent differences in the level of industrial production between the 1927 or 
1929 vintages relative to the 1933 or 1935 vintages. Comparing the 1927 and 1929 vintages we 
find that most revisions were positive, an indication that industrial production was seen as having 
been  higher  than  the  actual  data  available  in  1927  would  have  suggested.  Revisions  are 
consistently in the 1-2% range and significantly different from zero. By 1933 or 1935, revisions 
are not statistically different from zero, and the sample variance is not significantly different 
from  one.  The  last  result  does  not  hold,  however,  when  the  1927  and  1935  vintages  are 
compared. A comparison of the September 1929 vintage with subsequent vintages also yields a 
mean zero revision but the variance is significantly greater than one. Indeed, what is striking 
about the 1927 and 1929 vintages, relative to the 1933 or 1935 ones, are the relatively large 
errors in the 1921-22 period with many revisions in the order of 4 to 8%. It appears that earlier 
vintages of industrial production tended to be overly optimistic about output in the US economy 
while  some  revisions  to  1921  and  1922  data  suggest  that  the  recovery  was  stronger  than 
originally perceived. It is worthwhile recalling that the Fed’s thinking and concern over stock 
market developments began to change around 1928, as noted by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) 
and Meltzer (2003), among others. It is clear, therefore, that real time data offer some insights 
into what may have prompted the Fed to rethink its stance on monetary policy. Finally, someone 
in  1933  looking  back  on  economic  performance  in  September  1929  would  have  revised 
downward several monthly estimates of industrial production from 1925-1928. 
Orphanides (2003) argues that the eponymous Taylor rule can serve as a device to aid in 
the understanding of the historical monetary policy performance of the Fed during the 1920s and 
1930s. However, he does not formally present estimates of a Fed reaction function. Hetzel (2007, 
2008) also argues that it is useful to interpret the Fed’s monetary policy over the course of its 
history as akin to the application of a succession of rules that may be modified when events 
                                                 
15 I also tried to construct a real-time data set for wholesale and consumer prices based on the Survey of Current 
Business but there were too few observations for inclusion in the subsequent analysis.    12
dictate the need to make adjustments. In what follows I estimate reaction functions of the form 
suggested by Giannoni and Woodford (2003; also see Woodford 2003, p. 584ff), and Orphanides 
(2003). The form of the estimated reaction functions are thought to be the most robust to changes 
in underlying economic conditions.  Giannoni and Woodford (2003) specify a Taylor rule of the 
form 
*
1 1 2 1 t t t t y t t i i i i y p r r f p f e - - D = + + D + + D + % %             (1) 
where lagged changes in interest rates (Dit-1) also determines it.
16  The change in the output gap 
reflects the need to account for large measurement errors in this variable. Commitment to such a 
rule is shown to imply a determinate equilibrium from a timeless perspective and, as such, is 
optimal, as well as satisfying the Taylor principle. That fact that equation (1) is based on the 
current projection of inflation and the output gap also seems consistent with the manner in which 
monetary policy would have been carried out in the period considered in this study.  
  Orphanides (2003) recommends a rule that contains both forward and backward-looking 
elements, as well as the level of the output gap, and is written 
* '
ˆ 1 1 3 3 1 t t t y t y t t i i i y y p r f p f f e - + D + - = + + + D + + % % %             (2) 
where pt+3 and ( 3 ˆt y + D ) are the three months ahead conditional expectations of inflation and the 
change in the output gap. Orphanides (2003, p. 1007) shows how this specification nests various 
forms of the Taylor rule that have appeared in the literature.  
  Expressions such as (1) are often estimated via least squares. In contrast, equations such 
as (2) are usually estimated via Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) since the forward-
looking terms are endogenous. Estimated coefficients are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Full sample 
estimates based on final revised data produce an estimated natural real rate of interest of 1.65% 
(col. 1) but this coefficient is not statistically significant at conventional significance levels. The 
estimate of the steady-state impact of inflation on the nominal interest rate is below one, the 
threshold suggested by the Taylor principle, but one cannot reject the null that fp = 1 using a 
Wald test.
17 Notice, however, that the sign on  y fD%  is incorrect, indicating that a larger positive 
deviation in the output gap results in a reduction in the interest rate. Given that real time date 
                                                 
16 It should be noted that Giannoni and Woodford (2003) also consider other rules that incorporate more forward-
looking behavior but argue in favor of a rule such as (1). 
17 The steady state parameters are obtained by dividing the estimated coefficients by (1-r1).   13
(see below) reveals that the actual fall in output was larger than expected, this finding may not be 
surprising. There is also evidence that the residuals are severely non-normal. It is, of course, 
possible that the coefficients are unstable over the period considered. Hence, some sub-sample 
estimation is clearly in order. 
  Hansen’s (1997) test for a break in a linear regression based on a threshold variable (here 
the lagged interest rate) suggests a break in November 1929. This appears to be a sensible choice 
for a break given that the stock market crash took place at the end of October. Other breaks are 
possible, of course, but estimating (1) and (2), for shorter samples, jeopardize the economic 
significance that one can attach to any of the coefficients.
18 The pre-crash sample reveals an 
equilibrium real interest rate of 4.48% (col. 2) while the same estimate for the post-crash era is 
far lower at 1.26% (col. 7), though still significantly different from zero. The Fed seems to have 
behaved roughly as the Taylor principle would predict, at least in the pre-crash sample.  
  The picture is quite different once we consider real-time data (cols 3 to 6). Based on the 
September 1927 vintage, Fed policy appears to be loose since no statistically significant response 
to inflation is detected and the equilibrium real interest rate not statistically different from zero. 
Unlike estimates based on final revised estimates, however, there is a significant and positive 
reaction to changes in the output gap. When the September 1935 vintage of data is considered, 
we now find that Fed monetary policy is restrictive since the estimated equilibrium real interest 
rate is found to be 4.71%, and there is a greater than unit response in the nominal interest rate 
from a rise in inflation. While such estimates are instructive, they do not provide any indication 
about whether the Fed’s response was influenced by stock market developments.
19 
  Estimates of forward-looking policy rules appear in Table 2. The reaction to inflation 
shocks based on equation (2), though positive, is insignificant in both samples. Interestingly, 
there is not much evidence that the degree of interest rate smoothing, high throughout, changed 
over time with persistence (i.e., r1). There remains significant serial correlation in the squared 
residuals, however, only in the pre-crash sample. 
                                                 
18 Sensitivity tests were carried out assuming breaks in the neighbourhood of November 1929 but the conclusions 
discussed below are unchanged. I also estimated a version where allowance is made for individual Board Directors 
throughout the sample to have a separate influence on the course of interest rate developments (i.e., Harding, 
Crissinger, Young, Meyer, Black and Eccles administrations) but the relevant dummy variables were all statistically 
insignificant (p-values in excess of 0.10). 
19 In principle, one could also add a stock market return variable to equations (1) and (2) but this creates additional 
econometric problems. For example, see Fuhrer and Tootell (2004), and references therein. I explicitly deal with this 
issue in the following section.   14
An important element in GMM estimation, often ignored, is the choice of instruments. If 
these  are  weak  the  resulting  biases  can  lead  to  misleading  inferences  (see  Hall  2005). 
Accordingly, Table 2 also presents tests of instrument relevance. These measures indicate the 
extent to which the chosen instrument set is correlated with the endogenous variables in the 
policy rule (while being orthogonal to the residuals). The tests reveal that lagged money growth 
and stock returns are the most statistically relevant instruments, as demonstrated by the partial R
2 
and  F-tests  also  shown  in  Table  2  (SET  2  and  SET  3,  respectively),  whereas  a  standard 
instrument set that relies only on lags of the right hand side variables (SET 1), typically the 
strategy followed by most researchers, is less adequate. This is especially true for the sample that 
spans the post 1929 stock market crash.
 20  
  What are we to make of these results? First, the Fed clearly under reacted to inflation or 
deflation. Second, when stock returns are used as instruments the performance of a Taylor rule 
improves, especially before 1929.  
   5.  Identifying Policy Reactions to Stock Prices  
5.1 Identification Through Heteroskedasticity 
The  motivation  behind  Rigobon  and  Sack’s  (2003)  identification  technique  (also  see 
Rigobon 2003) is similar to the one used to solve the identification problem in the standard 
example of supply and demand curves. It requires identification of volatility regimes in order to 
estimate the slope parameters of interest, namely how stock price changes affect interest rate 
movements.  
To investigate the relationship between the Fed’s monetary policy and the stock market, I 
adapt version of the dynamic structural equations specified by Rigobon and Sack (2003) written 
as: 
t t t t t z x s i e g q b + + + =   (3) 
t t t t t z x i s h f a + + + = ,  (4) 
where  t i  denotes the short-term interest rate and  t s  represents stock returns or some other proxy 
for stock market performance. The parameter we are interested in is b in equation (3). The 
vector  t x  contains lags of  t i  and  t s , as well as inflation and the output gap, while  t z  captures 
                                                 
20 While I am unable to produce forward-looking estimates based on real-time data, it is instructive to note that some 
of the key variables that forecasters at the time relied upon, namely money supply and equity returns (e.g., see 
Dominguez, Fair and Shapiro 1988), appear to be the most relevant instruments.   15
other unobservable shocks that may affect stock returns and the interest rate. The inclusion of  t z  
completes  the  specification  of  the  model  and  rules  out  factors  that  could  also  explain  the 
covariance between monetary policy actions and the stock return. The coefficient on zt in (4) is 
normalized to 1. 
Equation (3) is the monetary policy reaction function, and is the focus of this paper, (4) is 
the stock market reaction function, and the policy shock variable  t e  is orthogonal to the stock 
market  shocks t h .  Note  that  reaction  function  (3)  can  be  interpreted  as  a  version  of  the 
conventional Taylor rule augmented by the stock returns variable. At the monthly frequency, we 
write ] ~ , [ ¢ p = y xt , where p represents inflation and  y ~ is the output gap.  
If the parameter a  is different from zero, equation (3) cannot be estimated via OLS since 
b  is then a biased estimate of the reaction of the short-term interest rates to stock price changes 
owing  to  the  simultaneity  problem  referred  to  above.  Moreover,  t z  is  unobservable  which 
further contributes to a bias in OLS estimates ofb . Instead, an identification strategy is required. 
While several identification strategies are available, the Rigobon procedure exploits changes in 
the volatility in the time series of interest to permit estimation of the parameterb . We begin 
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and the covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals is: 
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The covariance matrix provides only three moments (the variance of  t i , the variance of  t s , and 
the covariance between  t i  and  t s ) but there are three unknown coefficients, namely a , b  and   16
g , as well as three unknown variances 
2
z s , 
2
h s  and 
2
e s . Instead of imposing zero restrictions on 
the  parameters  of  (3)  and  (4),  a  standard  approach  to  the  identification  problem  (also,  see 
below), an alternative strategy is proposed. If the covariance does not remain constant, a shift to 
a regime with a different covariance matrix provides three new equations as well three new 
unknown  parameters,  namely 
2
z s , 
2
h s  and 
2
e s .  Consequently,  there  are  now  effectively  9 
unknowns. If we then impose the restriction that the monetary policy shock,
2
h s , is constant we 
are left with 8 unknowns and 8 parameters and this permits just identification.
21 Hence, three 
additional equations are generated when there is a shift in the covariance matrix. Identification 
in this case requires at a minimum three volatility regimes. 
As shown in Rigobon and Sack (2003), and also in Rigobon (2003), the b  parameter must 
solve the following system of equations: 
) /( ) ( 12 , 21 11 , 21 12 , 21 12 , 21 DW - DW DW - DW = b b q ,  (9) 
) /( ) ( 12 , 31 11 , 31 22 , 31 12 , 31 DW - DW DW - DW = b b q .  (10) 
This is a system of equations with two unknowns  ) , ( b q  and is, therefore, just identified when 
there are three volatility regimes. Each additional regime requires another equation of the same 
type in which case the system becomes over-identified. In this case it is possible to test for the 
validity of over-identifying restrictions and this allows us to test the stability of the β parameter. 
The  terms  in  (9)  and  (10)  represent  elements  that  produce  changes  in  the  covariance 
matrices from regime  1 = i  to  3 , 2 = i . These can be identified with the help of the covariance 
matrix under each regime  3 , 2 , 1 = i  written as:  
( )
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i .  (11) 
Moreover, defining the change of the covariance matrix from regime  1 = i  to regime  2 = i  as 
1 2 21 W - W = DW  and, equivalently, the change of the covariance matrix from regime  1 = i  to 
regime  3 = i  as  1 3 31 W - W = DW  equation (11) implies for  3 , 2 = j : 
                                                 
21 Additionally, a , b  and g  are assumed as stable across the covariance regimes, an assumption often invoked in 
the reaction function literature. We can test the validity of such an assumption (see below).   17
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, 1 h h h s s s - = D j j . Hence,  kl j , 1 DW  in equations (9) and (10) is 
the element k  and l in matrix 3 , 2 = j . In this fashion we are able to test the stability of b  to the 
selection of volatility regimes. 
22 
  Among  the  objections  one  might  raise  about  the  proposed  specification  is  that  it 
presumes the Fed reacts to stock returns, instead of ‘excessive’ speculation which the historical 
evidence suggests may have been of relatively greater concern to policy-makers. Indeed, a pre-
occupation of the Fed at the time focused on the possibility of a stock market bubble. Though 
this expression was not used in the 1920s, Wicker (2005) points out that reference to “boom 
psychology” amounts to essentially the same concept. Therefore, it may not have been stock 
returns per se that belong in the Fed’s reaction function but, rather, the degree to which the stock 
market  may  have  been  over-valued.  While  space  limitations  prevent  a  discussion  of  the 
difficulties surrounding the measurement of stock market bubbles suffice it to say that several 
economists believe that a bubble existed in 1928-29.
23 Among the simplest tests for detecting the 
presence of bubble like behavior is to ask whether stock prices behave like a random walk. If 
markets are  efficient the (log) dividend-rice ratio should display unit root behavior. Santoni 
(1987) finds this to be the case while Bohl and Siklos (2004), relying on threshold unit root and 
cointegration tests, find asymmetry in the random walk like behaviour of the dividend-price 
ratio consistent with the structural slumps view of Phelps (1994), relying on data that also covers 
the 1920-1938 period. Alternatively, one could simply apply a Hodrick-Prescott filter to the log 
of stock prices to obtain a proxy for the extent to which the stock market was over or under-
valued through time. All of these proxies were estimated and used to represent  t s  in equation 
(3). 
   5.2 Structural VARs 
  A more conventional approach consists in estimating the VAR (5), possibly adding other 
endogenous  as  well  as  exogenous  control  variables,  but  imposing  some  suitable  identifying 
                                                 
22 For further details on the solution of the identification problem see the appendix in Rigobon and Sack (2001) and 
Rigobon (2003). 
23 For example, Chandler (1970), Wigmore (1985) find in favour of the bubble hypothesis while Santoni (1987) and 
McGratan and Prescott (2003) reach the opposite conclusion.   18
restrictions  which  yields  a  structural  VAR  (SVAR).  Impulse  responses  and  variance 
decompositions can then be examined to determine the size of the interest rate response to stock 
returns. Long-run restrictions are defined such that the accumulated impulse responses are set to 
zero. As the general procedures involved in estimating structural VARs are well-known, readers 
are referred elsewhere for the details (e.g., see Hamilton 1994).  
A  common  assumption  in  the  literature  is  that  output  and  inflation  do  not  react 
contemporaneously to monetary policy shocks.
24 Bjørnland and  Leitemo (2005) consider the 
additional restriction that monetary policy has no long-run impact on stock prices. This type of 
SVAR is estimated below for the available data.  
  It is important to point out that the set of long-run restrictions often resorted to in the 
literature does not identifyb  using changes in the volatility of key macroeconomic aggregates, a 
feature  of  the  data  I  argued  above  pre-occupied  policy-makers  throughout  the  sample 
considered.  Nevertheless,  results  from  SVARs  should  aid  in  illuminating  the  relationship 
between interest rates and stock returns and, in particular, the relationship between monetary 
policy shocks and stock returns. 
6. Empirical Estimates 
Tables  3  and  4  present  estimates  of  b  in  (3)  relying  on  Rigobon’s  approach.  The 
distribution of b is evaluated via bootstrapping (see Rigobon 2003). The results in Table 4 are 
based on a VAR where deviations of stock prices from some fundamental value proxies  t s  in 
equation (3). Once again this is tantamount to assuming that the Fed had some target for stock 
market  performance.
 25 As  noted  earlier,  the  technique  used  here  requires  that  at  least  three 
volatility regimes be identified. While rolling standard deviations, GARCH (1,1), and Markov 
switching approaches led to somewhat different dating of volatility regimes, the impact on the 
estimated value of b  is generally modest.  
                                                 
24 Bagliano and Favero (1998) demonstrate that Rudebusch’s (1998) critique of VARs does not suffer from the 
Lucas critique. Sims (1998) also dismisses Rudebusch (1998) as not supported by a more careful understanding of 
what VARs are meant to accomplish, namely estimate what could meaningfully be called a monetary policy shock.  
25 For the VARs I relied on the NBER’s estimates of industrial production (series m16002a) available from 
www.nber.org. The output gap is then simply the HP filtered log level of the index series using a smoothing factor 
of 192,600. Since  ( )
HP
t t t s s s = - % is used, where  t s %  is the H-P filtered log of stock prices, the implicit assumption 
is that the Fed targeted some trend level in stock returns. The conclusions were unaffected when we used the levels 
of the same endogenous variables.   19
There is a statistically significant negative contemporaneous relationship between stock 
returns and interest rates when three volatility regimes are identified ( ˆ 0.49 b = - ). This result 
holds up even if we use the spread between the discount rate and the commercial paper rate, 
although with a p-value of 0.11 the estimate of β is not, strictly speaking, statistically different 
at the conventional 10% level. It appears that a policy of monetary ease (i.e., a lower nominal 
interest rate) can contemporaneously explain rising stock returns. This suggests that monetary 
policy was indeed contributing to the eventual stock market ‘bubble’. When four regimes are 
assumed, chosen according to the earlier historical narrative, then b is no longer statistically 
significant. However, since the case with four regimes is over-identified, we can test whether the 
additional restriction can be rejected. When the dependent variable is the change in the interest 
rate, the null that  ˆ 0 b D =  cannot be rejected, and the p-values are such that the hypothesis of 
coefficient stability cannot be rejected. Therefore, estimates relying on three volatility regimes 
are correct. When the dependent variable is the interest rate spread there is a rejection of the null 
of  constancy  for  the  case  where  regime  II  (1929-31)  is  excluded.  However,  the  coefficient 
remains negative ( ˆ 1.30 b = - ) and does not differ much from the all regimes estimate shown in 
line 1. 
Table 4 considers additional tests of the robustness of the findings reported in Table 3. 
Stock returns are now proxied by the log change in the dividend-price ratio. When volatility 
regimes are chosen according to a GARCH(1,1) model (Table 4A), there is some evidence of 
parameter instability. While the estimate across all regimes remains negative but statistically 
insignificant,  as  reported  in  Table  3,  exclusion  of  the  period  1932-34  results  in  a  positive 
relationship between the interest rate and the dividend-price ratio. This translates into a fall in 
stock prices (see section 4.1). Finally, when a Markov switching approach is used to estimate 
volatility regimes, the relationship between interest rates and the dividend-price ratio becomes 
statistically insignificant. However, as the null  that  ˆ 0 b D =  cannot be rejected in any of the 
cases considered, there is no reason to consider this number of volatility regimes. Hence, the 
results in Table 4A remain valid and consistent with the findings in Table 3.  
It  is  also  worthwhile  asking  whether  the  foregoing  results  are  dependent  on  the 
identification assumptions. Bjørnland and Leitemo (2005) estimate a structural VAR (SVAR) 
that combines the short-run identification assumptions of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans   20
(1999) together with the further restriction that monetary policy has no long-run effect on (real) 
stock returns. A five variable VAR that consists of the output gap, inflation, commodity price 
inflation,  the  interest  rate  (either  in  levels  or  in  first  differences),  and  stock  returns,  as  the 
endogenous variables, was estimated. Other estimation details are provided in Table 5. 
Figures 5A and 5B plot the impulse responses to a monetary policy (MP) shock using the 
identification  assumptions  of  Bjørnland  and  Leitemo  (2005).  A  positive  MP  shock,  again 
following  Christiano,  Eichenbaum  and  Evans  (1999),  signals  a  tighter  monetary  policy.  To 
conserve space, I omit the responses of commodity prices as well as the responses from to the 
other structural shocks in the system. These are available on request. The impulse responses 
differ as between the 1920-29 and 1931-38 samples. MP shocks are expansionary after 2 periods 
(months) prior to the stock market crash but the size of the response is economically small. In 
contrast,  a  tightening  of  monetary  policy  is  contractionary  for  up  to  9  periods  after  1930. 
Clearly, the Fed did not tighten sufficiently prior to the stock market crash, and this conclusion 
is  also  compatible  with  the  result  from  applying  Rigobon’s  procedure.  MP  shocks  are 
deflationary prior to the stock market crash while the same sized shock is mildly inflationary in 
the 1931-38 sample, at least for the first 2 periods. It is also interesting to note that a MP shock 
elicits a negative interest rate response after only 3 months.
26  In contrast, the responses remain 
positive throughout the post 1929 stock market period (Figure 5B), a finding that is reminiscent 
of  the  results  obtained  for  more  recent  U.S.  data  (e.g.,  Christiano,  Eichenbaum,  and  Evans 
1999). Finally, notice that MP contributes to rising stock prices, at least for the first 3 periods, 
while the response is largely negative in the 1931-38 sample. These results are also consistent 
with the results based on the Rigobon procedure.  
Turning to the variance decompositions provided in Tables 5A and 5B, we first find that 
in the 1931-38 sample (Table 5B), a MP shock explains output, inflation, the interest rate and 
stock returns in roughly equal proportions, at least at horizons of 5 months or longer. Moreover, 
the impact of a MP shock remains persistent over at least 10 periods. There are, however, two 
noticeable differences between the two samples. While MP shocks explain similar proportions 
of the variation in inflation and the interest rate in both samples, the variance decompositions of 
a MP shock on output and stock prices are much smaller in the pre 1929 stock market crash 
                                                 
26 The fact that the interest rate variable enters in levels in the SVARs presented in Figures 5A and 5B makes no 
difference to the results. They are qualitatively the same results when the interest rate is differenced.   21
period than in the second sub-sample considered. The general implication of these results is that 
MP explains a smaller portion of the variation of output and stock prices prior to 1929 than after 
this event. Therefore, there was greater policy activism after the Crash. Moreover, the results 
complement the ones obtained via the Rigobon approach and reveal a more activist Fed after the 
1929 stock market crash. 
There  are  clearly  advantages  and  drawbacks  to  relying  on  SVARs  to  address  the 
questions of interest in this paper (also, see Rubio-Ramírez, Sargent, and Watson 2007). First, 
none of the specified SVARs permit a direct role for the volatility in the macroeconomic time 
series of interest. Second, we are not able to examine sample or regime sensitivity of impulse 
responses and variance decompositions to the same extent as when Rigobon’s procedure is used. 
Finally, it is difficult to know whether policy-makers would have been guided by the principle 
of the long run neutrality of monetary policy on stock returns, while the results that rely on 
changing volatility to identify the Fed’s reactions to the stock market arguably seem closer to the 
reality of how policy was conducted during the time investigated in this study. Nevertheless, 
SVARs allow us to evaluate the impact of the various shocks – not only the MP shocks – on all 
the  endogenous  variables  in  the  model  unlike  Rigobon’s  identification  through 
heteroskedasticity approach. The results presented in Figure 5 and Table 5 support the findings 
in Tables 3 and 4, and even those presented in Tables 1 and 2 that rely on Taylor rule estimation.  
7. Conclusions 
  This paper has examined the conduct of US monetary policy during the period 1920-
1938,  paying  particular  attention  to  the  potential  role  of  stock  market  developments  in 
influencing  interest  rate  determination,  and  relying  on  volatility  in  selected  macroeconomic 
indicators to identify Fed interest rate setting behavior. I find that the Fed did indeed take into 
account stock market performance but that its reaction may have hastened the onset of the stock 
market crash of 1929. A negative contemporaneous correlation between stock prices and interest 
rates is a feature of the data prior to approximately 1929. Thereafter, the Fed reacted to rising 
stock prices by increasing interest rates. Therefore, monetary policy responses did indeed change 
during this watershed era in U.S. economic history. A plausible scenario is that the Riefler-
Burgess  model  led  to  erroneous  policy  decisions  until  the  early  1930s.  More  importantly, 
volatility contributed to fostering disagreement among policy-makers over the proper course of 
action. A lack of cohesion in the decision-making process also exacerbated monetary policy’s   22
contribution to the severity of the Great Depression. The paper also illustrates how the use of 
real time data to conduct inferences about policy making can yield useful insights that can help 
explain the shift in the Fed’s thinking after 1928. Unfortunately, data limitations prevent the use 
of real time data to estimate the contemporaneous impact of stock returns on the interest rate. 
This  could  be  the  subject  of  future  research.  Similarly, it  would  be  interesting  to speculate 
whether the Fed’s behaviour would have been different had the Stabilization Bills, advocating a 
policy akin to what today would be called inflation targeting, been passed by Congress in the 
1920s (see Meltzer 2003). This kind of counterfactual experiment is also left for future research.                               
.                                                                               23
 
 Table 1  Estimated Taylor Rules: Equation (1) 
  t t y t t t t y i i i i e + D f + p f + D r + r + = p - -
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Note: Estimates of (1) were generated using OLS (s.e. shown in parenthesis). ARCH(1) is the 
test for ARCH errors of order 1, and JB is the Jarque-Bera test of normality in the residuals (p-
values in parenthesis). See the text for variable definitions and symbols. Data are at the monthly 
frequency. 
1  Estimates  are  for  a  sample  ending  October  1929; 
2  Steady-state  coefficient 
estimates; for the constant the Null tested is whether i* is significantly different from zero, or 
whether  fp  is significantly different from 1.  
+ indicates coefficient is statistically significant, at least the 5% level (* at least at the 10% 
level).   24
Table 2  Forward-Looking Taylor Rules: Equation (2) 
  t t y t y t t t y y i i i e¢ + f + D f + p f + r + = - + + p - 1 ~ 3 ~ 3 1 1
~ ~ *  
  1920.01 – 1929.10  1930.01 – 1938.06 
  Instruments 







































































1 r  
0.48  0.57  0.55  0.14  0.12  0.11 
























Tests for Instrument Relevance 
Variable Partial R
2 
p p p pt  .45  .45  .47  .44  .52  .72 
t y ~ D   .16  .21  .22  .30  .43  .38 
F-test 
p p p pt  361.11  292.93  314.01  216.95  205.23  224.20 
t y ~ D   3.27  2.82  3.65  3.31  3.56  7.17 
Note: Estimates of steady state parameters based on (2) use GMM with robust s.e. shown in 
parenthesis.  2
1 r  is the first order autocorrelation coefficient, Q is the Box-Ljung test for first 
order serial correlation, J is the test for the validity of over-identifying restrictions. Two tests for 
instrument relevance are the partial R
2 due to Godfrey (1999) and the F-test (see Stock, Wright, 
and Yogo 2002) with bold values indicating rejection of the null of instrument irrelevance. An F-
statistic above 10 is considered sufficiently high to reject the null. 
+ indicates statistically significant at at least the 5% level. For coefficients, standard errors in 
parenthesis; for Q and J tests p-values are shown in parenthesis. SET1 consists of 6 lags of CPR 
and the right hand side endogenous variables in (2); SET2 is set 1 + 6 lags of money growth (see 
the appendix for the definition and sources); SET3 consists of set 1+ 6 lags of the HP filtered 
S&P index. Equation (1) is estimated using OLS. All data are monthly. 
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Table 3 Estimates of the Fed’s Reaction to the Stock Market, 1920-1938   
  Dep. Var.: Change in CPR  Dep. Var.: DR-CPR spread
4 
Regimes  b ˆ   b Dˆ   H0  p-value  b ˆ   b Dˆ   H0  p-value 




-0.49    b b b b=0  .055  -1.07    b=0  .11 
TEST FOR PARAMETER STABILITY 
All regimes less I 
(1920-29)
 1 
0.28  -.254  b Dˆ =0 
.365  -1.49  -0.42  b Dˆ  
.11 
“     “           “    II 
(1929-34)
 1 
-0.35  -.324  b Dˆ =0 
.125  -1.30  2.97  b Dˆ  
.07 
“     “         “     III 
(1934-38)
 1 
0.12  -.094  b Dˆ =0 
.425  1.70  2.99  b Dˆ  
.24 






.026    b=0  .495  1.67    b=0  .26 
1.  Regimes: I = 1920.03 – 1929.01(low); II = 1929.02 – 1931.10 (high; Great Depression); 
III = 1931.11 – 1934.02(low); IV= 1934.03-1938.12 (high) 
2.  Regimes: I = 1920.03 – 1929.07 (low); II = 1929.08 – 1934.02 (high; Great Depression); 
III= 1934.03-1938.12 (low)  
Note: b is the parameter measuring the Fed’s reaction to the stock market. The model is 
given by equations (3) and (4). s %is defined as the H-P filtered log of stock prices. For the 
VAR, 2  lags in money growth and the output gap are included as exogenous variables in 
addition to four lags for the endogenous variables. The p-values for the null hypothesis 
shown are synthetic based on a bootstrapping procedure. See Rigobon (2003). Estimates are 
based on a GAUSS program adapted from Rigobon (2003).    26
Table 4 Additional Estimates of the Fed’s Reaction to the Stock Market, 1920-1938 
 
A) Dating Volatility Regimes using a GARCH (1,1) Model 
 
Regimes  b ˆ   b Dˆ   H0  p-value 
All regimes   -0.29    b=0  .390 
TEST FOR PARAMETER STABILITY 
All regimes less I 
(1929-30)
 1 
0.56  .850  b Dˆ =0  .220 
“     “           “    II 
(1932-24)
 1 
1.57  1.86  b Dˆ =0  .080 
 
B)  Dating Volatility Regimes using a Markov Switching Model 
Regimes  b ˆ   b Dˆ   H0  p-value 
All regimes
2  -0.54  -  b ˆ =0  .380 
TEST FOR PARAMETER STABILITY 
All regimes less I 
(1920)
 2 
-0.47  0.07  b Dˆ =0  .370 
“     “           “    II 
(1929-30)
 2 
-0.06  0.48  b Dˆ =0  .490 
“     “         “     III 
(1931-34)
 2 
-0.54  0.003  b Dˆ =0  .360 
“     “       “      IV 
(1937-38)
 2 
-0.46  0.08  b Dˆ =0  .410 
 
Notes: See Notes to Table 3. All data are monthly. 
1 Regimes: I = 1929.10 – 1930.09 (high; Great Depression); II = 1932.01 – 1934.06 (high); all 
other months are low volatility regimes. Regimes are dated according to the variances from a 
GARCH(1,1) model fitted to the residuals for equation (3) in the VAR described in the text. s  is 
proxied by the log change of the dividend-price ratio. 
2 I = 1920.03 – 1920.11 (high); II = 1929.04 – 1930.03 (high; Great Depression); III = 1931.06 
– 1934.06 (low); IV=1937.06-1938.01 (high); all other months are low volatility regimes. 
Regimes are dated according to a Markov switching model fitted to the log change in the 
dividend-price ratio.   27
Table 5A Variance Decompositions from a Structural VAR: 1920-1929, Monthly 
    
Variance 
decomposition 
of output   
Variance 
decomposition 
of inflation   
Variance 
decomposition 
of the interest 
rate   
Variance 
decomposition 
of stock returns 
    Source of shock 
 Period  S.E. 
Monetary 
Policy  S.E. 
Monetary 
Policy  S.E. 
Monetary 
Policy  S.E. 
Monetary 
Policy 
 1   0.014   0.002   0.574   75.558   3.072   16.901   0.127   9.786 
 2   0.021   0.354   0.906   40.470   5.403   8.428   0.199   7.467 
 3   0.027   0.642   1.158   29.915   6.950   6.881   0.243   4.491 
 4   0.031   0.960   1.444   25.240   8.127   5.976   0.260   4.028 
 5   0.033   1.336   1.607   24.765   9.401   7.803   0.272   4.412 
 6   0.034   1.403   1.696   23.109   10.544   10.317   0.283   5.510 
 7   0.034   1.488   1.779   21.198   11.289   11.275   0.294   6.784 
 8   0.035   1.436   1.870   19.640   11.975   12.552   0.313   6.206 
 9   0.036   1.358   2.008   17.034   12.820   11.980   0.322   5.164 
 10   0.037   1.292   2.135   15.079   13.446   11.384   0.330   4.693 
 
Note: A VAR consisting of the output gap, inflation, commodity price inflation, the nominal interest rate (NY commercial paper 
rate), and the HP filtered log of stock prices, in that order, with 12 lags is estimated. The restrictions imposed to achieve 
identification are described in the text. The sample is 1920:02-1929:10. The figures in the table are in percent. To conserve space 
only the impact of the monetary policy shock on the variables above are shown. Also not shown are impulse responses on 
commodity price inflation. 
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Table 5B Variance Decompositions from a Structural VAR: 1930-1938, Monthly 
   
 Variance 
decomposition 
of output   
Variance 
decomposition 
of inflation   
Variance 
decomposition 
of the interest 
rate   
Variance 
decomposition 
of stock returns 
    Source of shock 
 Period  S.E. 
Monetary  
Policy  S.E. 
Monetary  
Policy   S.E. 
Monetary  
Policy  S.E. 
Monetary 
Policy  
 1   0.020   13.237   0.564   18.425   2.845   38.467   0.162   0.503 
 2   0.028   8.437   0.757   10.544   4.534   22.455   0.267   1.112 
 3   0.039   6.642   0.881   11.075   5.889   13.309   0.375   4.453 
 4   0.052   13.170   1.106   12.466   7.145   11.486   0.433   6.191 
 5   0.059   12.054   1.324   15.182   8.797   11.207   0.468   7.978 
 6   0.065   12.651   1.627   16.029   10.484   11.879   0.486   11.720 
 7   0.071   14.618   1.974   17.956   11.996   11.798   0.504   13.147 
 8   0.077   14.202   2.272   18.650   13.662   11.739   0.523   12.360 
 9   0.081   13.280   2.556   17.865   15.543   12.622   0.540   11.637 
 10   0.084   12.553   2.806   15.686   17.655   11.932   0.557   10.991 
 
Note: see note to Table 5A. The sample is 1931:06-1938:12 before lags. The same number of lags is the same as for the earlier 
sub-sample.  29
Figure 1  Comparing Volatility of Industrial Production and Stock Prices  



















































S & P, 1921-1938









































(B) Stock Prices 
Note:  Industrial production (1921-1938) is from FRED II (research.stlouis.fed.org/fred2) release G.17; data for 
1985-2003 is from IFS (International Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C.). Annual rate of change in the index is 
evaluated as the fourth order log difference of the levels. S&P data is from Global Financial Data and IFS (for  
1985-2003). Log levels were HP filtered with smoothing parameter 14,400.    30
Figure 2 Interest Rates and Stock Returns, 1920-1938 
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Note: See Figure 1. NBER reference chronology used is from www.nber.org. The solid line is the monthly 
return evaluated as the first log difference of the S&P index. The dashed line is the annual return evaluated as 
the fourth order difference in the log level of the S&P index. Data are from Global Financial Data.    31
Figure 3  Rolling  Standard  Deviations  and  Correlations:  S&P  Index  and  N.Y. 
















































































































Note: See Figure 1. The top figure plots the rolling standard deviation of the series based on a 9 month window 
beginning with the 1919:02-1919.11 sample. The bottom plot shows the moving simple correlation coefficient 
between the S&P and the commercial paper rate, again based on a 9 month rolling window. Data are from 
sources given in Figures 1 and 2. 
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1920 1922 1924 1926 1928
September 1929 Vintage Relative to September 1935 Vintage
 
Note: The vertical axis is 100- (vintage (i) /vintage (j))*100, where vintage (i) is September 1927 
or September 1929; vintage (j) is September 1919, February 1933, or September 1935. Source is 
given in the paper. Monthly data from 1919.01 to 1929.07 is plotted.  33
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Response of stock returns to MP
Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations
 
Note: Also see note to Table 5A for a description of the VAR. 
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Note: See note to Figure 5A.   35
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